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Abstract. This paper presents an illustration of the utilization of an information 
model through a complex system. The information model is in support of a 
model driven methodology of complex system design. It allows addressing 
requirements definition and their traceability towards the solution and the 
Verification and Validation (V&V) elements. The work considers especially an 
important system propriety which is safety. SysML language is used to 
establish the information model thanks to the different available diagrams 
which make SysML as the language for systems engineering. The system 
considered is the braking system of an aircraft. 
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1 Introduction 
Modern systems are inherently complex [1]. Complexity implies that different parts 
of the system are interdependent so that changes in one part may have effects on other 
parts of the system. In this case system engineering processes are critical and 
addressing safety proprieties (considered as emergent) needs a global approach. In [2] 
we proposed an approach that integrates safety [3] evaluation of complex systems in 
the system engineering process. This approach allows considering safety not in small 
but in large. The proposed approach is based on system engineering standard        
EIA-632. 
The requirement engineering process is generally considered as the most critical 
process within the development of complex systems [4]. In the support of the 
integration approach, we have defined an information model [2] based on SysML 
language to address requirements definition and their traceability [5] towards the 
solution elements and the V&V (Verification and Validation) elements. In this paper 
we illustrate the utility of the information model through a complex system which is 
the brake system of an aircraft.  
  
2 Integration approach  
2.1 System engineering approach 
System engineering is an interdisciplinary approach which develops concepts that 
allow building new applications. It is a collaborative process for problem resolution, 
supporting knowledge, methods and techniques resulting from the sciences and 
experiment in order to define a system which satisfies identified needs and is 
acceptable for the environment, while seeking has to balance total economy of the 
solution, on all the aspects of the problem in all the phases of the development and the 
life of the system.  In SE it is a good practice to describe processes adopting the EIA 
standard. There are thirteen processes covering the management issues, the 
supply/acquisition, design and requirement and verification validation processes [6]. 
2.2 Integration approach 
Managing requirements, and specially safety requirements, at the early stages of 
system development becomes more and more important as system complexity is 
continuously growing. Safety of complex systems relies heavily on the emergent 
properties that result from the complex interdependencies that exist among the 
involved systems or sub-systems and their environments. System Engineering (SE) is 
the ideal framework for the design of complex system. The need for systems 
engineering arose with the increase in complexity of systems and projects. A system 
engineering approach to safety starts with the basic assumption that  safety properties 
can only be treated adequately in their entirety when taking into account all the 
involved variables and the relations between the social and the technical aspects. This 
basis for system engineering has been stated as the principle that a system is more 
than the sum of its parts. The Safety management must follow all the steps of SE from 
the requirements definition to the verification and the validation of the system. The 
integration of safety must concern all system engineering processes. In our approach 
[2] we have identified all sub-processes concerned by the safety evaluation and we 
have indicated how they must be considered. In other words, the sub-processes of 
EIA-632 standard [7] are translated or refined in terms of safety and included in 
system design process. 
3 Information model 
3.1 Requirements management 
Requirements management is a crucial activity for the success of a project [4]. It is 
necessary to ensure that each requirement is properly declined, allocated, monitored, 
satisfied, verifiable, verified and justified. Figure 1 presents an overview of the 
requirements management of the EIA-632 standard. The proposed information model 
is inspired from this pattern. We see that other stakeholder requirements, when added 
to the acquirer requirements, make up a set of stakeholder requirements that are 
transformed into system technical requirements.  
The logical and physical solution representations are derived from technical 
requirements. Design solution and specified requirements are defined by completing 
the solution definition Process. 
 
 
Fig.1.Requirements management of the EIA-632 
An information model can be used to guide the design, to manage requirements 
changes, or to evaluate project progress. Indeed, modeling is important for the 
following reasons: it is a support for system analysis and design, it can be used for 
sharing knowledge and it is used to capitalize knowledge. Our information model is 
compatible with the requirements of the EIA-632 standard, while adding aspects of 
safety and risk management. We use SysML [9] language to establish this information 
model thanks to the different available diagrams which make SysML as the language 
for systems engineering. 
3.2 Requirements modeling and management for safety 
In this part, we propose a system approach to improve requirements management 
for safe system design. This approach is based on a SysML information model, 
following the SE process of the EIA-632 standard. This information model is the 
"system" knowledge basis of the design project, allowing data sharing between all 
expertise trades (mechanical, hydraulic, thermal, electrical...). Therefore, the model is 
intended to model the "system" level, showing the interactions with the environment 
and the connections between the various subsystems. 
The information model must be seen as a means of knowledge sharing, including 
the 3 components: requirements, design solution and V&V. It is considered as the 
interconnection level between all the different trades. 
The requirements, the design solution and the V&V parts are developed 
independently. We distinguish clearly these different concepts. 
SysML allows mixing all the concepts in a single diagram. We proposed an 
extension of SysML and information meta-model that allows structuring the elements 
of the design project with respect of the separation concepts. In other words, our 
approach allows a rigorous organization of the project design. Indeed, different 
diagrams manage different concepts. 
3.3 The information model 
The information model (Figure 2) that we propose is adapted to the EIA-632 
standard and makes a clear distinction between different requirements classes 
(acquirer, other stakeholders, technical or specified). 
To achieve this meta-model in SysML, we have extended the language. Firstly, we 
define new stereotypes to requirements, while adding new attributes to our 
requirements. Then we define a new link type (specify) linking the specified 





In this model, we have simplified the number of requirements classes. Indeed, we 
consider that the "systemTechnicalReqt" represents the system technical requirements, 
but also the system technical requirements non-allocated to the logical solution and 
the derived technical requirements coming from the logical and the physical solutions. 
The acquirer and other stakeholders’ requirements are represented, knowing that 
the field ‘requirement source’ must be consistent with the stereotype and indicates 
better the concerned stakeholders in the case of "OtherStakeholderReqt". 
Note: We invite readers who are not necessarily friendly with all the above 
concepts (system technical requirements, logical solution, physical solution …) to 
refer themselves to the EIA-632 standard [7] or the overview article [8]. 
All traceability links requested by the EIA-632 are considered in this model, and 
the distinction between logical solution (functional part) and physical solution 
(component part) appears. 
In this model, we highlight the definition of interfaces, which are components 
themselves and which links several components together. The concept of interface is 
essential for a proper system design. Indeed, it is one source of problems encountered 
during development. 
The last important element that is included in this model, neither a requirement nor 
a design solution element, is the "TestCase". These elements of V&V are included in 
the model to be directly connected to the requirements they satisfy. 
Concerning safety requirements and the consideration of safety in design, which 
can be derived from risk analysis, a block risk is defined and is linked to safety 
requirements. In fact, identification of risks is the starting point for many studies 
about security, but also reliability. Thus, defining a block “risk” in the information 
model and its link with the safety requirements, allows on one way to improve the 
system understanding and justifying the requirement, and on the other way to show 
that all the identified risks are taken into account.  
Impact analyses also derive benefit from the presence of risks in the information 
model, because the risks, which could be challenged by model element (requirement, 
function, component…) changing, can be viewed directly. 
4 Application: the “S18 aircraft” system 
In this part we present a case study to illustrate the interest of the SysML 
information model on a complex example. It consists on an S18 aircraft that the 
specifications are provided by the standard ARP-4761 [10]. We will consider a 
hierarchical decomposition using the notion of the building block defined by the 
standard EIA-632 and on which is based our approach of safety integration in system 
engineering processes. However, due to limited space in the paper, we will present 
only one building block (one level). 
4.1 Presentation 
The S18 aircraft is a four engine airliner used to transport passengers. It can carry 
out 300 to 500 passengers on 5,000 nautical miles at Mach 0.86. The average flight 
time is 5 hours. 
4.1.1 Functions 
Various functions are performed by this system: "control thrust", "control flight 
path", "determine orientation", "determine position and heading", "control aircraft on 
the ground", "control cabin environment"… 
These functions can be decomposed into sub-functions, like "control aircraft on 
the ground" whose sub-functions are: "determine air/ground transition", "decelerate 
the aircraft on the ground", "control aircraft direction on the ground"… 
In this paper, we focus on only one the sub-function "decelerate the aircraft on the 
ground". 
4.1.2 Sub-systems 
The aircraft system consists of several sub-systems, like: structure, thrust system, 
control surface system, spoiler system, thrust reverse system, wheel brake system… 
Thanks to the interaction between these sub-systems, the above listed functions can be 
performed. 
Sub-systems involved in the "decelerate the aircraft on the ground" function are: 
the "thrust reversers", the "spoilers" and the "wheel brakes". 
Thrust reversers are associated with reactors and can reverse the direction of thrust. 
They can be used only above a certain speed (otherwise hot gases are injected again in 
the reactors which can cause damage). 
Spoilers are movable surfaces on the wings which are used to reduce lift and 
increase drag. Consequently, they slow down the speed of the aircraft, preventing to 
take-off again by transferring more weight on the wheels. They are efficient only 
above a certain speed. 
 Finally, the wheel brakes are used at all speeds and are located on the main 
landing gear (not on the front). They can be used asymmetrically, to counteract 
against a crosswind or to make tight turns. 
4.2 SysML Modeling 
The following section presents the SysML modeling of the building block 
corresponding to the level presented previously: the aircraft system. 
This modeling will respect the information model defined in paragraph 3.3 and its 
goal is to share engineering data through a common basis. This information will be 
shared between the various participants in the design, particularly between system 
engineers and safety engineers. In fact, most of the modeling presented here focuses 
on the definition of requirements and traceability links. 
A structure in three packages organizes the modeling following the separation of 
concepts (requirements, solution design and verification and validation). Thus, the 
three packages are: "Design Solution”, "Requirements", and "V&V". The tool TauG2 
of IBM is used to generate the different diagrams. 
4.2.1 “Design solution” package 
The first package presents the design solution. It contains two diagrams: 
1. A use case diagram, showing the system functions, 
2. A block diagram for the system structure. 
4.2.1.1 System functions 
Figure 3 shows the system functions through a use case diagram. Showing also the 
system's actors, the use cases represent the functions. A hierarchical structure between 
these functions is performed using "include" links. For example, the "decelerate 
aircraft on the ground" function is a sub-function of the "control aircraft on the 
ground" function, which is a sub-function of the "pilot the aircraft" function. 
 
 
Fig.3. S18 aircraft – System functions 
4.2.1.2 System structure 
Parts of the "S18 aircraft" system structure are represented in a blocks diagram in 
Figure 4. It shows that the "S18 aircraft" is composed of a structure, a thrust system, a 
surface control system, a spoiler system, a thrust inverser system, and a wheel brake 
system. 
4.2.2 “Requirements” Package 
The second presented package is the "Requirements" package. There are four 
requirement diagrams for: 
1. Top-level requirements, to present the requirements at the system level, 
"S18 Aircraft" for this first building block, and to link those requirements to 
the risks they deal with the "treat" link 
2. Requirement declinations, to show the declination of the system 
requirements into subsystem requirements through the composition link, 
3. Requirement satisfaction, to indicate the system elements (system or 
subsystems) that meet the requirements by the "satisfy" link, 
4. Requirement verification, to denote elements of V&V which satisfy the 
requirements by the "verify" link. 
 Fig.4. S18 aircraft – System structure 
4.2.2.1 “Top-level requirements” diagram 
Figure 5 shows the top-level requirements of the S18 aircraft. Only two risks 
appear "high speed overrun" and "offside excursion from the runway". Their severities 
are between two values; this is due to a modeling simplification to not multiply the 
number of risks according to the landing, taxi, or aborted takeoff phases. 
In this diagram, we find for example the system safety requirement 
"unannounciated loss of deceleration capacity must have a frequency <5.10-9/flt" 
identified during the FMEA of the S18 aircraft system [11]. This requirement, whose 
identifier is "R2", can treat the risk "Risk_1": "the aircraft do a high speed overrun 
and can hit obstacles" identified during the preliminary risk analysis. 
4.2.2.2 Requirement declinations diagram 
Figure 6 shows the declination of top-level requirements (S18 aircraft system) in 
sub-systems requirements. We find here two declinations concerning the system 
requirements "unannounciated loss of deceleration" and "inadvertent deceleration 
after V1", which are declined on the sub-systems: thrust inversers, wheel brakes and 
spoilers. 
4.1.1.1 Requirement satisfaction diagram 
Figure 7 shows the allocations of requirements to the elements of the design 
solution, through the "satisfy" link of SysML. These elements can be any elements 
other than the SysML requirements, but in our model they correspond to blocks 
(representing systems) or use cases (representing functions). 
 Regarding the two above requirement declinations, system requirements are 
related to system elements, which correspond to "S18 aircraft" system functions 
(modeled with use cases). For the subsystem requirements, they are associated to 
blocks representing sub-systems (wheel brakes, thrust inversers, spoilers). 
 Fig.5. S18 aircraft – “Top-level Requirements” diagram 
On the bottom of the diagram (figure 7), a set of requirements was simply linked to 
the "S18 aircraft" block representing the system. For a complete modeling, these 
requirements should also be declined. But to limit the size of the example, we do not 
study in depth these requirements. 
4.1.1.2 Requirement verification diagram 
Figure 8 shows the verification links between operations of V&V (which are 
stereotyped by “TestCase”) and system requirements. In this paper, only two basic 
system requirements, roots of the declinations, are considered in this diagram. Then, 
operations of V&V correspond to safety analysis. They are defined in the "V&V" 
package presented below. 
 Fig.6. S18 aircraft – Requirement declinations diagram 
 
Fig.7. S18 aircraft – Requirement satisfaction diagram 
Thus, the requirement named "unannounciated loss of deceleration" will be 
verified, according to the diagram, by the operation called "loss of deceleration safety 
analysis". 
 
Fig.8. S18 aircraft – Requirement verification diagram 
4.1.2 V&V package: test cases 
The last package presented is the "V&V" package, which contains the test cases. It 
contains the diagram of Figure 9, which defines the two operations of V&V presented 
in the previous paragraph. For these operations, we associate comments in the 
diagram to specify them: 
 For the operation "loss of deceleration safety analysis": analyze with the 
fault tree of the root event "unannunciated loss of deceleration". 
 For the operation "inadvertent deceleration after V1 safety analysis": analyze 
with the fault tree of the root event "inadvertent deceleration after V1". 
 
Fig.9. S18 aircraft – Test case diagram 
In this paper, the two lower levels: the "wheel brake system" and the "BSCU 
calculator" are not presented. The same organization as the first level is considered. 
5 Conclusion 
Different concepts are handled in complex system design: requirements, design 
solution and V&V.  An information model aims to help engineers in the expression of 
these concepts, and the creation of traceability links between them in order to 
facilitate the comprehension and/or the impacts analysis. It also helps to formalize the 
practice of systems engineering through the use of models. The objective is to 
improve quality/productivity and to reduce risk by introducing rigor, precision, and 
communications among system/project stakeholders and managing complexity. 
The present paper show how the information model can be used through a complex 
system which consists on braking system of an aircraft. The objectives are to 
demonstrate the contribution and the added value of the information model and the 
scalability of the approach. Some additional work is needed for the validation of this 
information model and will be considered in future work. It is, for example, 
interesting to define automatism to ensure consistency with the meta-model.  
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